Abstract
The article analyzes the development of the problem of passive constitution in Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology. While passive synthesis becomes a central theme mainly in his later works—Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, The Crisis of European Sciences, Cartesian Meditations, and writings on intersubjectivity (Husserliana XIII–XV)—its foundations are already outlined in earlier texts (Ideas I–II, Lectures on Internal Time-Consciousness). Husserl distinguishes active and passive spheres of consciousness, revealing the stratified structure of the passive sphere and its role in the constitution of subjectivity. In later analyses, passivity appears as a condition of the normal course of perception and as an associative flow that ensures the continuity of consciousness. Thus, the development of Husserl’s treatment of passivity can be seen as a movement from implicit distinctions to a systematic explication of passive syntheses, thereby opening the way to a genetic phenomenology of subjectivity.